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•  Since 2006, the Bank of Canada has spearheaded 
a research program to examine the merits of 
switching to a regime that targets the price level 
rather than the rate of inﬂ  ation.
•  This article reviews model-based research focused 
on examining the relative merits of the two regimes 
in a small open economy, such as Canada’s, that 
is susceptible to large and persistent shocks to 
its terms of trade. Research on the optimal price 
index under price-level targeting is also discussed.
•  The balance of evidence suggests that the two 
regimes, implemented through simple policy rules, 
are quite similar in their ability to stabilize inﬂ  ation, 
the output gap, and interest rates.
•  Conditional on adopting price-level targeting, the 
overall CPI would represent close to an ideal index 
to target.
I
n the autumn of 2006, researchers at the Bank of 
Canada embarked on an ambitious program to 
explore the potential welfare gains of switching from 
the Bank’s current framework of targeting the rate of 
change in prices (i.e., inﬂ  ation) to targeting the price 
level.
1 While research to date had suggested possible 
gains, several questions pertinent to Canada were 
identiﬁ  ed as requiring further research. Among these 
was, What are the relative merits of inﬂ  ation targeting 
versus price-level targeting in an open economy 
susceptible to large and persistent terms-of-trade 
shocks? (Bank of Canada 2006). 
At issue is whether a central bank that targets an 
aggregate price index, such as the consumer price 
index (CPI), would be required to generate large ﬂ  uc-
tuations in output to offset the price-level effects from 
shocks to speciﬁ  c sectors. For instance, commodity-
price movements tend to be both large and persistent, 
and inﬂ  uence the CPI directly through the price of 
gasoline and other forms of energy. Whereas a cred-
ible inﬂ  ation-targeting central bank can generally look 
through these types of ﬂ  uctuations, since their impact 
on inﬂ  ation is highly transitory, a price-level-targeting 
central bank must respond by generating offsetting 
price-level movements in other sectors. As a result, 
price-level targeting could lead to greater aggregate 
volatility in an economy that is subject to large rela-
tive-price shocks. 
This article reviews recent Bank of Canada research 
on the relative merits of price-level targeting (PLT) 
and inﬂ  ation targeting (IT) for a small open economy 
that is subject to large and persistent terms-of-trade 
shocks.
2 The ﬁ  rst section describes the basic mech-
anics of so-called history-dependent monetary policy, 
of which PLT is one special case, and discusses the 
1  The potential beneﬁ  ts to the Canadian economy of reducing the inﬂ  ation target from its 
current level of 2 per cent per year are also being explored. 
2  A more general review of research on price-level targeting is provided in Ambler (2009).
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in terms of economic stabilization. This is followed by 
an examination of recent model-based research com-
paring PLT with IT in a small open economy that is 
subject to relative-price shocks. The robustness of 
these results to, among other things, alternative 
assumptions about expectations formation is then 
discussed. Finally, research on the optimal price index 
to target under PLT is summarized before conclusions 
are drawn.
PLT as a Special Case of History-
Dependent Monetary Policy
Targeting the price level, as opposed to the rate of 
inﬂ  ation, can be thought of as a particular example of 
what is referred to as history-dependent monetary 
policy (Woodford 2003). History dependence simply 
means that monetary policy responds to past economic 
conditions, in addition to current and expected future 
conditions. This typically implies that policy will con-
tinue to respond to shocks, even after their impact on 
inﬂ  ation and/or the output gap has fully dissipated. As 
a result, inﬂ  ation will often exhibit a secondary cycle, 
meaning that the price-level effects generated by the 
shock will be partially, or fully, reversed.
3 For example, 
if a shock initially causes inﬂ  ation to rise above some 
target rate, policy will continue to maintain interest 
rates above neutral until inﬂ  ation moves below the 
target. This would imply that monetary policy causes 
inﬂ  ation to undershoot the target when inﬂ  ation is 
initially above target, and vice versa.
Based on this description, it is easy to see how price-
level targeting represents a special case of history-
dependent policy. Consider a central bank that 
chooses to target a constant price level through time. 
Following an economic shock that initially raises the 
price level (and creates inﬂ  ation), the bank will subse-
quently engineer a period of deﬂ  ation until the overall 
price level returns to the desired level. This type of 
response pattern is equivalent to responding to the 
sum of the current, and all previous, rates of inﬂ  ation.
4 
The appeal of PLT within the class of history-
dependent policies is its transparency and relative 
ease of communication. 
3  The term secondary does not mean that the cycle is of secondary importance, but that 
it comes after a ﬁ  rst cycle.
4  In fact, the price level in any period is proportional to the product of all past gross inﬂ  a-
tion rates, and approximately equal to the sum of all past net inﬂ  ation rates, where 
the gross inﬂ  ation rate from period   to period   is   and the net inﬂ  ation 
rate is  .
Having established the mechanics of history depend-
ence, we next turn to the fundamental question of 
how a central bank might beneﬁ  t from adopting such 
an approach to setting monetary policy. It is not 
immediately obvious why a central bank seeking to 
stabilize inﬂ  ation would want to cause secondary 
cycles in inﬂ  ation, since this is clearly destabilizing 
to the economy, other things being equal. The key 
insight from the literature on history dependence is 
that such a policy will not leave other things equal. 
Speciﬁ  cally, if expectations of future inﬂ  ation, which 
inﬂ  uence current inﬂ  ation, correctly take account of 
the secondary cycle in inﬂ  ation, they will exert a sta-
bilizing effect on current inﬂ  ation. Indeed, any policy 
that causes inﬂ  ation to be lower (higher) in the future 
will also cause current inﬂ  ation to be lower (higher) 
when expectations are forward looking. Intuitively, a 
ﬁ  rm that is considering a price change in the current 
period, knowing that this change will have to be 
reversed in the next period, will have less incentive 
to institute the change.
The appeal of PLT within 
the class of history-dependent policies 
is its transparency and relative ease 
of communication.
To better understand the mechanics of the expecta-
tions channel, consider the simplest form of the 
so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC):
  , (1)
where   is the rate of price inﬂ  ation,
5   is the 
rate of inﬂ  ation expected to prevail in the next period 
(conditional on period-  information),   is the per cent 
difference between real GDP and potential GDP 
(i.e., the output gap),   and   are constant param-
eters that are set to one for simplicity, and   is a 
random shock, sometimes interpreted as a change to 
ﬁ  rms’ desired markup of price over marginal cost. The 
New Keynesian model is based on two crucial 
assumptions: (i) ﬁ  rms change prices only periodically, 
meaning that prices generally remain ﬁ  xed for more 
than one period, and (ii) ﬁ  rms form their expectations 
about the future in a rational way. Since it is known 
that the chosen price will likely remain in effect for 
5  The inﬂ  ation target is assumed to be zero.
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not imply any undershooting of inﬂ  ation, meaning that 
there are beneﬁ  ts to responding to past economic 
conditions even if no secondary cycle in inﬂ  ation is 
generated. Nevertheless, an even better outcome can 
be obtained if a secondary cycle is permitted. For 
instance, suppose we now allow the central bank to 
multiple periods, account is taken of both current and 
expected future demand conditions, which implies 
that aggregate inﬂ  ation is a forward-looking variable.
For the purpose of this discussion, we assume that 
inﬂ  ation is determined according to equation (1) and 
that the instrument of monetary policy is the output 
gap. Thus, equation (1) also describes how policy 
inﬂ  uences inﬂ  ation. Finally, for simplicity, we assume 
that the central bank cares equally about stabilizing 
inﬂ  ation around its target and output around its poten-
tial. We can therefore describe the preferences of the 
central bank in terms of the following simple loss 
function:
  , (2)
where   and   are, respectively, the variance of 
inﬂ  ation (relative to the target) and output (relative to 
potential output).
First, suppose that the central bank seeks to minimize 
equation (2) by responding only to current inﬂ  ation. 
We can therefore write the central bank’s reaction 
function as  . Since we are assuming that 
 and that   is the only type of shock in the 
economy, we will obtain the result that  . Now 
suppose that the economy is faced with a two-period 
shock in which  ,  , and is zero thereafter. 
The optimal response of the output gap and inﬂ  ation 
in each period is plotted in Chart 1 (example 1), and, 
as our optimal rule implies, one is just the mirror 
image of the other, and total loss equals 0.91. 
But suppose we relax the assumption that the central 
bank can respond only to current inﬂ  ation and, instead, 
assume that it sets the same value of the output gap 
in each of the ﬁ  rst two periods. In this scenario, the 
response is consistent with a reaction function of the 
form  . The optimal level for the 
output gap is -0.5 in both periods, which results in a 
total loss of 0.75 (example 2 in Chart 1). The reason 
behind this interesting result is quite simple: the output 
gap set in period 2 affects inﬂ  ation in periods 1 and 2 
when inﬂ  ation expectations are forward looking, 
whereas the output gap set in period 1 affects inﬂ  a-
tion only in period 1. In this sense, the central bank 
obtains a better inﬂ  ation/output trade-off by commit-
ting to generating a larger output gap in period 2 and 
a smaller output gap in period 1, relative to the ﬁ  rst 
example. Of course, such a desirable outcome is 
possible only if inﬂ  ation expectations explicitly take 
account of future demand conditions.
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exists between pure IT and pure PLT is quite important 
when researchers compare the two, using policy rules 
that feature interest rate smoothing.
Recent Research on Relative-
Price Shocks and PLT 
Comparisons of the efﬁ  cacy of PLT relative to IT 
typically involve the use of optimized simple monetary 
policy rules that implement each regime in a quantita-
tive macroeconomic model. This article surveys recent 
research using ToTEM, BoC-GEM, and a third small-
open-economy model, all of which feature multiple 
production sectors and signiﬁ  cant heterogeneity 
across sectors.
9 
The simple policy rules considered in each paper can 
be written as
  ,
(Inﬂ  ation-forecast rule)    (4)
for an IT regime, and
  ,
(Price-level-forecast rule)    (5)
for a PLT regime, where   is the policy interest rate in 
period  ;   is the long-run steady-state level of interest 
rates;   is the period   expectation of 
inﬂ  ation (log price level) in period  ;   is the output 
gap;  ,  , and   are ﬁ  xed parameters that 
determine the degree of interest rate smoothing and 
the sensitivity of the policy rate to deviations of inﬂ  ation 
(price level) from target and the output gap, respect-
ively.
10 Note that the feedback horizon,  , determines 
the horizon of the response to inﬂ  ation relative to its 
target,  , or the (log) price level relative to its target, 
.
The ﬁ  rst rule is referred to as an inﬂ  ation-forecast (IF) 
rule, since the policy rate responds to a forecast of 
inﬂ  ation, whereas the second rule is referred to as a 
price-level-forecast (PLF) rule. Since the IF rule ensures 
9  For a description of the Terms of Trade Economic Model, ToTEM, see Murchison and 
Rennison (2006). The Bank of Canada’s version of the IMF’s Global Economic Model, 
BoC-GEM, is described in Lalonde and Muir (2007), and a description of the third model 
can be found in de Resende, Dib, and Kichian (2010). 
10 Inﬂ  ation and interest rates are expressed as quarterly rates of change.
choose the output gap as it wishes in each of the ﬁ  rst 
3 periods and that the output gap is zero thereafter 
(as shown in example 3, Chart 1). Given this option, 
the central bank generates a better inﬂ  ation/output 
trade-off by maintaining the economy in excess 
supply in period 3, since this has a stabilizing effect 
on inﬂ  ation in periods 1 and 2. The cost of this, as 
measured by deﬂ  ation in period 3, is smaller than the 
beneﬁ  t, since the overall loss declines from 0.75 in 
example 2, to 0.65 in example 3.
Woodford (2003) illustrates this basic point using the 
NKPC given by equation (1) and the loss function 
given by equation (2).
6 He shows that the optimal 
response to a positive markup shock, which initially 
causes inﬂ  ation to rise, is to subsequently generate 
deﬂ  ation until the price level returns to its pre-shock 
level. In other words, optimal monetary policy under 
commitment is consistent with targeting the price 
level, even though it is inﬂ  ation that appears in the 
loss function. The particular policy rule consistent 
with achieving this outcome is given as
7
  , (3)
which is history dependent in the sense that the central 
bank chooses the current period’s output gap partly 
as a function of the previous period’s output gap.
8
That equation (3) implements PLT while setting the 
policy instrument as a function of inﬂ  ation demon-
strates the need to distinguish between policy regimes, 
such as IT and PLT, and the variables appearing in a 
history-dependent policy rule. In many instances, a 
history-dependent policy rule may implement aspects of 
both IT and PLT regimes in the short run. For instance, 
if we reduce the weight on the lagged output gap, 
 in equation (3) to a positive number less than 
one, then a positive markup shock may still eventu-
ally lead to a period of deﬂ  ation, but it will be insufﬁ  -
cient to fully return the price level to its control level. In 
this example, a deliberate undershooting of the inﬂ  a-
tion target may be inconsistent with the spirit of an IT 
regime, whereas not fully restoring the price level to its 
control level would be inconsistent with PLT.
6  Except that the weight on the variance of the output gap is less than one.
7  For simplicity, we ignore the initial-period problem in which policy does not respond to 
the lagged output gap. The issue of the time-inconsistency of this type of policy, as well 
as a suggested solution, is discussed in Woodford (2003).
8  If we solve equation (3) “backwards” to eliminate the lag of the output gap, we obtain 
a (negative) relationship between the current period’s output gap and the sum of the 
current and all past inﬂ  ation rates. This is equivalent to responding to the price level. 
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12 It is worth noting that 
this loss function accords no cost to price-level vola-
tility per se, other than via its link to overall inﬂ  ation 
volatility. Therefore, it does not capture any explicit 
beneﬁ  ts associated with reduced price-level uncer-
tainty under PLT.
Using a distribution of shocks estimated by ToTEM 
over the period 1995Q1 to 2008Q4,
13 together with 
this loss function, the author simulates losses for 
different values of the policy-rule parameters  , 
, and   for the IF and PLF rules described 
by equations (4) and (5). Those parameter values that 
produce the lowest value of   for each rule are 
retained and used to compare the IT and PLT 
regimes.
Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (2008) use a very similar 
set-up but with a two-country (Canada and the 
United States), two-sector (tradables and non-
tradables) version of the IMF’s Global Economic 
Model (GEM), calibrated to Canadian and U.S. data 
from 1983 to 2004.
14 They also consider policy rules 
of the form given by equations (4) and (5) and a loss 
function similar to equation (6). 
De Resende, Dib, and Kichian (2010) compare IT and 
PLT in an estimated small-open-economy model with 
multiple production sectors, sector-speciﬁ  c capital, 
and imperfect labour mobility between sectors. These 
model features are motivated by the idea that sector-
speciﬁ  c shocks will generally mean that monetary 
policy will face a trade-off between stabilizing certain 
sectors and, consequently, destabilizing others. The 
importance of this trade-off will depend on the degree 
of factor mobility across sectors. While the authors 
also consider simple IF and PLF policy rules, their loss 
function is derived explicitly from the structure of the 
model.
15 As a result, the parameters of the policy 
rules are chosen to maximize the expected welfare of 
the representative household in the model, rather than 
an ad hoc loss function such as equation (6). 
All three studies carefully consider the implications of 
relative-price shocks, including shocks that affect 
Canada’s terms of trade, and broadly conclude that 
12 Including   in the loss function reduces the volatility of interest rate changes quite 
signiﬁ  cantly but has little impact on the variance of inﬂ  ation or the output gap. Excess 
instrument volatility may be disruptive to ﬁ  nancial markets for reasons not captured by 
the models used.
13 The various types of structural shocks modelled in ToTEM are described in Murchison 
and Rennison (2006). 
14 They estimate their shocks using a longer sample and use a smaller weight on the 
variance of the ﬁ  rst difference of interest rates (0.1) than Murchison (0.5). They also 
use core CPI inﬂ  ation in the loss function.
15 Welfare analysis is conducted based on a second-order approximation of the model 
(and the utility function) around its deterministic steady state.
that the rate of inﬂ  ation equals the target rate in the 
long run but, in general, makes no explicit provision to 
return the price level to a pre-speciﬁ  ed level, this rule is 
loosely interpreted as implementing inﬂ  ation targeting. 
The PLF rule, in contrast, does set policy explicitly to 
achieve a particular outcome for prices,  , and 
is therefore more consistent with price-level targeting 
in the long run. Having said that, just as the policy rule 
given by equation (3) implements aspects of both IT 
and PLT when the weight on the lagged instrument is 
less than one, the introduction of a lag of the instru-
ment in equation (4) means that the IF rule will display 
history dependence and will therefore, to some degree, 
mimic the behaviour of a PLF rule with no lagged 
instrument. Similarly, equation (5) will, to some degree, 
mimic a rule that responds to the sum of past price-
level gaps. As a result, some caution is warranted in 
mapping policy regimes, such as IT and PLT, to 
simple feedback rules such as the IF and PLF rules 
considered in these studies.
The version of ToTEM used in Murchison (forthcoming) 
explicitly models the CPI as a function of the Bank of 
Canada’s measure of core CPI and the Canadian-dollar 
price of energy.
11 A permanent shock to the world 
oil price has both a demand component, driven by 
changes in wealth, and a relative-price channel, since 
commodities are both a factor of production of ﬁ  nished 
goods and ﬁ  nal goods themselves (e.g., gasoline and 
home heating fuel). As a result, energy-price shocks 
involve a tension between stabilizing CPI inﬂ  ation and 
stabilizing the output gap. Explicitly accounting for 
energy-price movements is crucial to the question 
addressed in Murchison since they explain much of 
the short-term volatility in the CPI, and their effect 
on the level of the CPI tends to be long lasting or 
permanent.
Murchison assumes that the policy-maker’s prefer-
ences are well described by the following simple loss 
function:
  , (6)
which penalizes the (unconditional) variance of CPI 
inﬂ  ation and the output gap equally, and also puts a 
weight of 0.5 on the variance of the quarterly change 
11  The author uses the Bank of Canada’s energy-commodity price index, which is 
converted to Canadian dollars using the current nominal exchange rate. This set-up 
assumes that movements in the world price of energy and the exchange rate are im-
mediately and fully passed through to the consumer prices for energy products, such as 
gasoline, at a quarterly frequency.
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17 Regard  less of the 
rule considered, an unanticipated rise in energy prices 
causes an immediate increase in the Canadian-dollar 
price of energy and, hence, in the overall CPI (Chart 3). 
The transmission of commodity-price shocks in 
ToTEM is discussed extensively in Murchison and 
Rennison (2006). For the purposes of this article, it is 
sufﬁ  cient to highlight that slightly more than 25 per 
cent of the increase in the world energy price is offset 
(with the IF rule), in terms of the Canadian-dollar price, 
by an immediate and permanent appreciation of the 
Canadian dollar. As a result, the overall increase in the 
CPI is more muted than would be the case with a 
ﬁ  xed exchange rate. As the exchange rate apprecia-
tion is gradually passed through to import and export 
prices, net exports weaken, and upward pressures on 
core CPI inﬂ  ation decline. 
The responses of the IF and PLF rules to the shock 
are broadly similar: policy gradually tightens (years 1 
and 2) and then loosens, in both cases by a modest 
17  Optimal policy is computed in ToTEM following Dennis (2007). It is optimal under the 
assumption of no uncertainty other than that associated with imperfect knowledge 
of future shocks and the loss function given by equation (6). It would not generally be 
optimal in the presence of non-additive uncertainty, such as parameter, model, and 
real-time data uncertainty (Cateau and Murchison 2010).
PLF and IF rules yield very similar overall stabilization 
properties (“Unconstrained” rules, Table 1). When all 
types of shocks are considered, the PLF rule dominates 
the IF rule by a small margin in ToTEM and in 
BoC-GEM, whereas de Resende, Dib, and Kichian 
ﬁ  nd no difference. In addition, the results for ToTEM 
and BoC-GEM suggest that when inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions are calibrated to be highly forward looking, the 
PLF rule also dominates the IF rule in the presence of 
relative-price shocks.
16 In other words, the gain real-
ized via the expectations channel outweighs the loss 
associated with having to stabilize the overall price 
level in response to sector-speciﬁ  c shocks.
The impact of a permanent 20 per cent increase in 
the world price of energy, simulated using ToTEM, is 
illustrated in Chart 2. Three policy rules are used: the 
optimized IF rule, the optimized PLF rule, and fully 
optimal policy under commitment (labelled Optimal). 
Fully optimal policy is a natural benchmark: it represents 
the absolute best outcome that policy can achieve for 
16 Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (2008) also consider a more recent sample (1995 to 2006), 
nearly identical to that used by Murchison, in which the persistence of inﬂ  ation is lower 
than over their full sample. As a result, the weight on lagged inﬂ  ation in their NKPC is 
set to zero, and PLT dominates IT for all shocks, including relative-price shocks.
Table 1: Inﬂ  ation- and price-level-forecast rules
Coefﬁ  cients of rule Loss(PLF-IF) Var. (PLF-IF)a
Paper/Rule
Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir  (2008)
Unconstrained IF 0.97 2.4 - 0.7 2 - ---
 PLF 0.85 - 3.7 0.9 3 -1 % -2% 2% 0
de Resende, Dib, and Kichian (2010)b
Unconstrained IF 0.68 2.5 - 0.0 0 - ---
 PLF 0.0 - 1.1 0.0 0 0% ---
Constrained IF 0.0 6.0 - 0.0 0 - ---
 PLF 0.0 - 1.1 0.0 0 -5% ---
Murchison (forthcoming)
Unconstrained IF 1.1 0.6 - 0.1 0 - ---
 PLF 0.98 - 0.09 0.2 4 -5% -4% -1% 0
Constrained IF 0.0 3.75 - 0.3 1 - ---
 PLF 0.0 - 0.34 0.3 4 -15% -7% -1% -7%
 IF 0.8 1.6 - 0.2 1 - ---
 PLF 0.8 - 0.1 0.2 4 -9% -5% -3% -1%
a.  Differences in variances across IF and PLF rules are expressed as a fraction of the total loss associated with the IF rule and weighted by their weight in equation (6). 
Thus, the differences for the three individual variables sum to the difference in loss (subject to rounding error).
b.  Variances are not shown, since the differences in welfare-based loss cannot be expressed solely in terms of these variables. 
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Source: Bank of Canada calculations
Note: A decrease represents an appreciation in the real exchange rate.
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IF and PLF rules, in the short run, it follows the PLF 
rule much more closely. It is not until year 3 that 
optimal policy takes a more expansionary stance, 
thereby allowing the overall price level to rise perma-
nently above control. Under the PLF rule, the CPI 
returns to the target near the end of year 3 but then 
remains below the target for several years. This under-
shooting of the price level is due to the high weight 
 on the lagged interest rate in the PLF rule 
and represents another example of the effect of intro-
ducing history dependence.
Simulations with ToTEM ﬁ  nd that 
PLT is well suited to handling energy-
price shocks and relative-price shocks 
more generally   and that it comes 
very close to replicating fully optimal 
policy under commitment.
When all types of shocks are considered, Murchison 
shows that the median time required for the price level 
to return to target is substantially longer than the target 
horizon for inﬂ  ation under IT, when optimized simple 
policy rules are considered. Speciﬁ  cally, it is shown 
that in a stochastic environment, with representative 
shocks drawn from the 1995–2008 sample hitting the 
economy each quarter, the median time required to 
return the price level to within ±0.5 per cent of the 
target is about 2.5 years,
22 about double that required 
to return year-over-year inﬂ  ation to within ±0.1 per-
centage points of the target with an optimized IF rule.
As discussed in the previous section, responding to 
past economic conditions implies history depend-
ence, which can have an important stabilizing effect 
on the economy when expectations explicitly take 
into account this feature of monetary policy. History 
dependence can be introduced directly, via the inclusion 
of lagged inﬂ  ation in the policy rule (see example 2, 
Chart 1), or by responding to lags of the policy instru-
ment itself (as in equations 3, 4, and 5). In all three 
studies cited here, the optimized IF rules respond 
positively to the level of the policy interest rate in the 
previous quarter, and the weights (captured by the 
parameter  ) range from 0.68 to 1.1. In other words, 
22 Under the assumption of no future shocks. The choice of 0.5 per cent as the threshold 
is arbitrary but seems reasonable considering the unconditional variance of the price 
level under PLT, using the optimized PLF rule.
amount.
18 However, under the PLF rule, it tightens by 
roughly 50 per cent more at the peak, implying a 
smaller initial increase in the output gap and a sharper 
decline in core CPI inﬂ  ation.
19 Higher real interest 
rates also cause a more pronounced appreciation of 
the exchange rate with the PLF rule, meaning that a 
smaller proportion of the increase in world energy 
prices gets passed on to Canadian consumers, and 
that net exports are weaker in year 2, relative to the 
IF rule. 
Based on these simulation results, the intuition that 
PLT requires greater volatility in output to stabilize the 
price level in response to a terms-of-trade shock is 
validated by ToTEM. To restore the CPI to the target, 
the PLF rule creates roughly twice as much excess 
supply (at the trough) as the IF rule. In terms of overall 
loss, however, which also factors in CPI inﬂ  ation and 
instrument volatility, the PLF rule (PLT) still outperforms 
the IF rule (IT) by 4 per cent, because the initial rise in 
inﬂ  ation is smaller under PLT.
20
To summarize, simulations with ToTEM ﬁ  nd that PLT 
is well suited to handling energy-price shocks and 
relative-price shocks more generally 
21 and that it 
comes very close to replicating fully optimal policy 
under commitment. In fact, Chart 2 illustrates that 
18 The shock pushes the Canadian economy into modest excess demand for about one 
year after the shock. As a result, even the IF rule initially tightens policy, despite the 
decline in pressures on core CPI inﬂ  ation.
19 For simplicity, the price-level target in the PLF rule and the inﬂ  ation target in the IF rule 
are both zero.
20 While the difference in the initial rise in inﬂ  ation between the IF and PLF rules is small, 
loss is calculated using the squared deviation of inﬂ  ation for each rule. Therefore, the 
larger the overall inﬂ  ation response, the greater will be the loss difference, for a given 
difference in responses across rules. In this shock, the CPI inﬂ  ation responses peak at 
between 1.0 and 1.25 percentage points above control, expressed at annual rates. 
21 See Murchison (forthcoming) for additional examples.
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the price level to control following a markup shock. 
Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (2008) conﬁ  rm the same 
basic result, using a more realistic quantitative model: 
the relative performance of an optimized PLF rule 
depends importantly on the weight on lagged inﬂ  ation. 
This result is quite intuitive: when pricing decisions 
depend on past, as opposed to future, economic 
conditions, future monetary policy actions become 
less inﬂ  uential for current price-setting behaviour.
In a follow-up paper, using a version of BoC-GEM 
that explicitly models emerging Asia and the block of 
commodity-exporting countries, Coletti et al. (forth-
coming) show that when inﬂ  ation is partially backward 
looking and the short-run supply and demand curves 
for energy are highly inelastic, IT dominates PLT in 
response to energy-price shocks, albeit by a modest 
amount. They also explore the idea that the source of 
the shock driving the terms of trade may matter for 
comparisons of PLT and IT. For example, the authors 
also consider the impact of a permanent increase in 
global productivity on commodity-importing 
regions. This shock has important implications for 
both the price of Canada’s exports (through higher 
energy prices) and for the price of imported goods 
(through a stronger exchange rate). In this instance, 
IT outperforms PLT by a signiﬁ  cant margin, close to 
25 per cent, which is substantially larger than in the 
case of an oil-supply shock. This is explained by two 
factors. First, in this version of BoC-GEM, a perma-
nent shock to the demand for oil induces a more 
persistent response in the price of oil and in marginal 
cost than a permanent shock to the supply of oil. 
Second, as opposed to a supply shock, a demand 
shock increases both the price of oil and the price of 
non-energy commodities, which reinforces the effect 
of the shock on the marginal cost. As a result, the 
impact on marginal cost is larger and more persistent 
for a demand shock than a shock to the supply of oil. 
Given the very different results across the different 
types of shocks to the terms of trade, it would be 
very useful to have a better idea of the relative 
importance of these types of shocks for the 
Canadian economy. 
Murchison (forthcoming) generalizes these results 
somewhat, showing that as past economic conditions 
become relatively more important than future condi-
tions to current private sector decisions, the relative 
performance of PLT tends to diminish, since the expec-
tations channel becomes relatively less inﬂ  uential.
24 
24 Short-run adjustment costs, rule-of-thumb behaviour, and habit persistence in con-
sumption all tend to increase the relative importance of past economic conditions.
the similarity between the performance of the IF and 
PLF rules found in these studies may be partly due to 
the fact that an IF rule with a high value of   can 
closely mimic the behaviour of a PLF rule. 
To explore the sensitivity of the results to the degree 
of interest rate smoothing, Murchison (forthcoming) 
and de Resende, Dib, and Kichian (2010) also com-
pare optimized IF and PLF rules that restrict   to zero, 
while Murchison also explores rules with   equal to 
0.8, which corresponds to the average of the historical 
estimates for Canada (“Constrained” in Table 1). In all 
cases, eliminating history dependence via interest 
rate smoothing penalizes the IF rules somewhat more 
than the PLF rules. Put a different way, rules that are 
already history dependent, owing to the inclusion of 
the price level, beneﬁ  t relatively less from the addi-
tional history dependence introduced through the 
lagged interest rate term. 
De Resende, Dib, and Kichian report that their pre-
ferred PLF rule generates a 5 per cent reduction in 
loss relative to the IF rule when  , compared with 
no difference when  . The corresponding num-
bers for Murchison are somewhat larger—15 per cent 
( ) and 9 per cent ( )—since interest rate 
volatility is explicitly penalized in equation (6) but does 
not generally appear in welfare-based loss functions.
23 
To summarize: When monetary policy commits to 
setting the current policy rate partly as a function of 
the past rate, in addition to the output gap and to a 
forecast of either inﬂ  ation or the price level, then IF and 
PLF rules are fairly similar in terms of their economic-
stabilization properties. When policy is restricted to 
responding only to the output gap and a forecast of 
either inﬂ  ation or the price level, then PLF rules are 
found to dominate IF rules. This suggests that there 
may be modest economic gains, measured in terms 
of greater stability, associated with the adoption of 
a target for the price level rather than for the rate 
of inﬂ  ation. 
Other Considerations
Robustness 
The discussion so far has emphasized the crucial 
link between the performance of history-dependent 
monetary policy, including PLT, and the presence of 
forward-looking price-setting behaviour in the eco-
nomy. Steinsson (2003) shows that as the relative 
importance of forward-looking expectations declines 
23 Responding to the lagged interest rate introduces additional inertia in interest rates, 
which reduces the variance of interest rate changes.
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welfare.
26 De Resende, Dib, and Kichian show that 
this result need not hold when other sources of rigidity 
are included in the model.
Shukayev and Ueberfeldt (2010) go a step further and 
compute the index weights for the eight major sub-
components of the CPI that maximize the expected 
utility of the representative household in their model. 
In theory, these weights could differ substantially from 
the expenditure-based weights used by Statistics 
Canada if there are signiﬁ  cant differences in price 
stickiness across the various components of the CPI. 
Using a model that includes sector-speciﬁ  c shocks to 
productivity and price markups, they ﬁ  nd the welfare 
gain from using a PLF rule that responds to the ideal 
index, relative to the expenditure-based index, to be 
small. 
Conclusion
This article reviews recent Bank of Canada research 
on the relative merits of price-level targeting and inﬂ  a-
tion targeting for a small open economy that is subject 
to large and persistent terms-of-trade shocks. While 
the quantitative results are mixed and somewhat 
dependent on the speciﬁ  c features of the model 
employed and the calibration of expectations, the 
balance of evidence suggests that PLT and IT, imple-
mented through simple PLF and IF rules, are fairly 
similar in their ability to stabilize inﬂ  ation, the output 
gap, and interest rates, although PLF rules generally 
perform better. Furthermore, this conclusion is robust 
to the inclusion of several types of relative-price 
shocks, including shocks to the terms of trade, 
although the results in Coletti et al. (forthcoming) 
indicate that the underlying source of terms-of-trade 
movements may matter for this assessment. Finally, 
the research suggests that, conditional on adopting 
PLT, the overall CPI would represent close to an ideal 
index to target.
26 The basic intuition for this stylized result is straightforward: if monetary policy can fully 
stabilize the price level in that sector, the welfare consequences of nominal rigidity 
become zero, because ﬁ  rms have no incentive to change prices.
For instance, when households place a high weight 
on smoothing the growth rate of consumption, the 
level of previous consumption becomes a more 
important determinant of current consumption, and 
the future path of real interest rates becomes relatively 
less important. Similarly, as short-run adjustment 
costs associated with changing the relative intensities 
of factor inputs, such as installed capital, increase, 
the level of the capital stock in the previous period 
becomes a more important determinant of the current 
capital stock. 
The overall robustness of PLT will depend on all of 
the structural parameters that govern the dynamics 
of the model in question, as well as the overall degree 
of uncertainty regarding their true values. In a related 
paper, Cateau, Desgagnés, and Murchison (forthcoming) 
derive optimized inﬂ  ation- and price-level-forecast 
rules for ToTEM and compare their performance 
across 5000 different parameterizations of the model.
25 
They conclude that, overall, optimized PLF rules are 
more robust to this form of uncertainty than optimized 
IF rules.
What is the appropriate price index 
to target?
In a simple one-good model with no relative prices, 
the choice of the price index is trivial. However, in 
more realistic multi-good models, such as those 
reviewed here, the question of what constitutes an 
ideal price index to target in a PLT regime can be 
considered from the perspective of minimizing either 
an ad hoc loss function, such as equation (6), or a 
welfare-based loss function. De Resende, Dib, and 
Kichian (2010) compare the performance of simple 
rules across ﬁ  ve distinct sectoral price indexes—the 
consumption sector (CPI), non-tradables, tradables, 
manufacturing, and import prices—and ﬁ  nd that 
targeting the CPI maximizes household welfare. 
Indeed, CPI targeting comes quite close to replicating 
the level of welfare that would obtain in the absence of 
nominal-price rigidity. The authors attribute this result 
to the inclusion of capital-adjustment costs in their 
model. Speciﬁ  cally, they show that when the cost of 
adjusting the capital stock in the non-tradable goods 
sector is low, it is optimal to target the price level in 
this sector. This result is consistent with previous work 
in the literature (Erceg, Henderson, and Levin 2000), 
which shows that monetary policy should aim to 
stabilize the price level in the sector with the stickiest 
prices, since it is precisely this stickiness that leads to 
25 These parameters are drawn from the Bayesian posterior distribution of the estimated 
parameters.
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